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From Philosopher to CriticIPoet: 
Quest for the Soul in the Poetry of T.S. Eliot 
Kyungsim Chung 
I. Introduction: Definition of the Soul 
What does " the soul" mean for T.S. Eliot and why is it most important to 
make out the process of "soul-making" in order to understand his poetry? It is 
not possible to answer these questions without the knowledge of Eliot's 
"Impersonal theory of poetry" and his philosophical thought of our knowledge 
and experience in the world. It is famous that Eliot requested of the poet escape 
from personality. By depersonalizing his personal experiences into something 
impersonal the poet is said to unite himself with tradition. Eliot's sense of 
tradition, h s  definition of poetry as "organic wholes", and what he thought the 
true poet to do ultimately come from his understanding of the world. But my 
object in this writing is not to introduce those old philosophical arguments 
around Eliot's doctrine about impersonality.1) In this essay I will try to 
understand the relationship of Eliot's philosophical thoughts and his early 
literary thoughts. Even though Eliot's doctoral dissertation on F.H. Bradley 
was published in 1964, the fact is that it was written in 1915 and 1916, and his 
first important literary writing, The Sacred Wood (1920), was published several 
years later. Thus it is my assumption that there be a close llnk between the two 
works, in that The Sacred Wood is largely the early literary expression of Eliot's 
philosophical thoughts. Reading the dissertation, I thought that I can give the 
original philosophical backgrounds for Eliot's important critical phrases such as 
1) Roughly speaking, there have been two conflicting arguments about Eliot's 
philosophical position. The negative opinion that Eliot's doctrine of impersonality is 
mystical (represented by Herbert Howarth, Northrop Frye, John D. Margolis, Kristian 
Smidt, and Grover Smith) had prevailed until challenged by Anne Bolgan's strikingly 
positive opinion. 
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"objective correlative," "dissociation of sensibility," and "depersonalization" in 
his early criticism. Rather my first impression was a kind of shocking that 
there had been a very comprehensive, but systematic construction of 
philosophy behind Eliot's poetry and critical thoughts. And I think 
understanding this philosophical basis ultimately leads me to make out Eliot's 
'soul,' which is I think the most important theme of hls poetry from the early 
Prufrock poems (1917) to the later Four Quartets (1935-1942).2) In this essay I 
wiU treat m d y  Eliot's early writings in The Sacred Wood and Selected Essays 
(1932), with his Harvard PhD dissertation, Knowledge and Experience in the 
Philosophy of F.H. Bradley (1964), leaving other critical works for the hture 
investigation. It is beyond my intention in this essay to analysize Eliot's early 
poetry in detail according to his philosophy. 
As the first step towards the understanding of the relation between Eliot's 
philosophical thoughts and his literary theories, I may start with a question: 
Why are the process of depersonalization in the creation of a work of art and 
the precise use of language the utmost important for him? 
The main point of Eliot's philosophical dissertation is against the dualistic 
thinking spread in Europe since the seventeenth century, for he thought thls 
dualistic thinking accelerated the split between thought and feeling, subject 
and object, mind and body, the ideal and the real, finally producing "a 
dssociation of sensibility": 
The poets of the seventeenth century, the successors of the dramatists 
of the sixteenth, possessed a mechanism of sensibility which could 
devour any kind of experience. ... In the seventeenth century a 
dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we have never recovered; 
and this dissociation, as is natural, was aggravated by the influence of 
the two most powerful poets of the century, Milton and Dryden. (SE 
287-8)* 
2) I must make it clear that I do distinguish Eliot's concept of 'soul' from that in Keats' 
'bale of soul-making and that in Yeats' "Now shall I make my soul", neither of which 
is not relevant to my argument. I hope Eliofs definition of 'soul' comes of itself in my 
discussion of his philosophical thesis. 
* Refer to 'Abbreviations' at the end of this writing. 
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According to Eliot, the two'kinds of influence of Milton and Dryden are 
these: on the one hand the poets became too "ratiocinative" and "descriptive," 
so "while the language became more refined, the feeling became more crude," 
and on the other hand the poets of the sentimental age "thought and felt by 
fits, unbalanced, whlle they revolted against the ratiocinative, the descriptive" 
(SE 288). The root of this thinking that feeling and thought should be one is 
found in Eliot's understanding of experience. Eliot's dissertation begins with a 
discussion of our knowledge of "immediate experience". 
According to Eliot, in our experience of the world there are three stages, 
immediate experience, the dissociated experience, and the final experience of 
the united sensibility or the new form of immediate experience. Our initial 
experience of the world of the objects is not hssociated. As soon as we feel the 
world self-consciously, our experience of the world becomes dissociated. Still 
there is a relation and a felt continuity between the object and the self. And 
the self which is related and objectifid is continuous with the subject self. In 
our observation of other's act we feel that there is a ceaseless transmutation of 
points of view, for other's act as a psychic event is not purely actual, but 
always involves the reference from the subject. So from the eventlobject 
through the subject to the poet/the reader there is a continuous readjustment 
of points of view. In this sense the object of imagination is only possible from 
the third or hlgher point of view. 
Out of the three stages, what is the most important to Eliot as a poet and a 
human being, is the third stage. It is only approachable from the ceaseless 
transmutation of points of view by which our immediate experience is 
recovered into a new form of unity. Eliot said that the third stage of our 
experience comes not spontaneously but only by achieving a new form of unity 
which recovers the unified sensibility of our immediate experience. 
Regrettably our history of literature is that  of dissociation since the 
seventeenth century. The task of the true poet is to recover the unified 
sensibility, to feel the thought as we smell the rose. 
Regrettably our history of literature is that of dissociation since the 
seventeenth century. We have not felt the thought as we smell the rose. The 
true poet must aim at the recovery of d i e d  sensibility through the work of 
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art as the object of imagination. To reach the wholeness of our experience, the 
work of art must be something that is the wholeness of the poet's experience 
and then enables the reader to retrace it without any invention of the poet. 
First, the work of art should be autotelic, which requires the poet to escape 
from his personality. Second, both the making and the evaluating of the work 
of art must be the process of "soul-making". Eliot's request of the poet escape 
from his personality comes from these demands: The work of art is something, 
whose creation on the part of the poet and evaluation on the part of the reader 
as well should be the act of "soul-making". For Eliot the soul is what enables 
us to know what a particular event is. 
"Soul-making" is the continuous process towards the re-creation of the 
unified sensibility, the soul being the transcendent self, which enables us to 
know what a particular event is. It is "the whole world of its experience of the 
self at any moment while both soul and event transcend that moment", i.e. the 
future as implied in the present as well as the past as implied in the present 
(EZE 78, My italics). It does not aim to restore the immediate experience but to 
create the unified sensibhty at higher stage, which is accomplished through 
the continuous transubstantiation of points of view. The final objective of 
"soul-making" is to transcend the state of our dissociate sensibility in this 
world, by transubstantiating (relating and unifying) the previous points of 
view or objectified selves, where there is the continuity between the object and 
the subject self, the world and the experiences of the self. Eliot's famous 
literary theories, "Impersonal theory of poetry", his sense of tradition, the 
dissociation of sensibility, objective correlative, a logic of the imagination, and 
the mythical method, may be said to be the literary version of his philosophical 
thought. 
Therefore, though it should be the ultimate ambition to investigate in what 
way Eliot's individual poem succeeded in this pursuit and in what way it 
failed, in this essay I will focus on the definition and the philosophical 
foundation of Eliot's Impersonal theory of poetry and "soul-making". Also there 
shall be a detailed discussion of the point of view, which is crucial to 
understand the process of "soul-making". Finally, out of his literary practices 
for "soul-making", such as  the speaker(s) in the poem, a logic of the 
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imagination, the mythical method, objective correlative, and so on, I shall 
briefly discuss Eliot's selective use of personal pronouns in his early poetry. 
11. The Process of Depersonalization 
For T.S. Eliot, the most important principle in the creation of a work of art 
is the process of depersonalization.3) In the famous essay, "Tradition and the 
Individual Talentn(1920), Eliot insists that "the poet must develop or procure 
the consciousness of the past and that he should continue to develop this 
consciousness throughout his career" (SW 52). In the creation of the work of 
art this consciousness of the past or the sense of tradition is, Eliot says, 
inseparably bound up with the process of depersonalization. According to 
Eliot, what happens to the poet during the creation is "a continual surrender 
of himself as he is at the moment to something which is more valuable," so 
"the process of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of 
personality" (SW 53). And "it is in this depersonalization that art may be said 
to approach the condition of science" (SW 53).4) The poet may not be a true 
poet until he accomplishes the two inseparable tasks, to develop the sense of 
tradition and to depersonalize his personal experiences. 
To define the process of depersonalization and its relation to the sense of 
tradition, it is crucial to understand two points: what Eliot thinks poetry to be 
and what "tradition" is. Eliot considers "the conception of poetry as a living 
whole of all the poetry that has ever been written" (SW 53). The best parts of a 
poet's work are "those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their 
3) In the use of the term 'depersonalization' I do not agree with Stephen Spender who 
said i t  "would imply as  Rimbaud's 'dereglement des sens' - the programmatic 
disorganization of the senses". Eliot. Fontana: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1975. 
P.149. I took the term from Eliot himself, when he said, "It is in this depersonalization 
that art may be said to approach the condition of science." ("Tradition and the 
Individual Talent", The Sacred Wood 53. My italics) And I wish the term to have its 
meaning in the discussion of Eliot's "Impersonal theory of poetry". 
4) Though I agree with Thomas Meighan, when he said "Depersonalization has two 
aspects: the reader's evaluation of a poem, and the relationship of the poet to his 
work," the present discussion is focused on the latter. T.S. Eliot: A Critical Study of 
His Principles and Achievements. New York: Vantage Press, 1977. P. 70. 
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immortality most vigorously" (SW 48). The essay has begun with Eliot's regret 
of the present trend in using the word "tradition" in English writing , where at 
most its adjective appears "in a phrase of censure" (SW 47), not in the 
appreciations of living or dead writers. He also strongly objects to a notion that 
"the only form of tradition, of handing down, consisted in following the ways of 
the immediate generation before us in a blind or timid adherence to its 
success" (SW 48): 
Tradition is a matter of much wider significance. I t  cannot be 
inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour. It 
involves, in the first place, the historical sense, which we may say 
nearly indispensable to anyone who would continue to be a poet 
beyond his twenty-fifth year; and the historical sense involves a 
perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence; the 
historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own 
generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the 
literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the 
literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and 
composes a simultaneous order. This historical sense, which is a sense 
of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the 
temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional. And it is at the 
same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious of his place in 
time, of his own contemporaneity. 
No poet, no artists of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His 
significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the 
dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you must set him, 
for contrast and comparison, among the dead. I mean this as  a 
principle of aesthetic, not merely historical, criticism. (SW 49. My 
italics.) 
"Tradition" is not a matter of one-sided influence. There is "conformity 
between the old and the new" (SW 50). While a new work of art is influenced 
by tradition in its creation, it also modifies "the whole existing order" when it 
comes: "the past should be altered by the present as much as the present is 
directed by the past" (SW 50). The poet who is aware of this conformity feels 
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great difficulties and responsibilities, because he is also aware that "he must 
be inevitably judged by the standards of the past" (SW 50). In other words the 
poet must be aware that "the mind of Europe - the mind of his own country 
- a mind which he learns in time to be much more important than his own 
private mind - is a mind which changes, and that  this change is a 
development which abandons nothing en route, which does not superannuate 
either Shakespeare, or Homer, or the rock drawing of the Magdalenian 
draughtsmen" (SW 51). 
In a later essay, "The Function of Criticism"(l923), Eliot gives more detailed 
definition of tradition. The literature which he thought in "Tradition and the 
Individual Talent" is, 
the literature of the world, of the literature of Europe, of the literature 
of a single country, not as a collection of the writings of individuals, 
but as 'organic wholes,' as systems in relation to which, and only in 
relation to which, individual works of literary art, and the works of 
individual artists, have their significance. There is accordingly 
something outside of the artist to which he owes allegiance, a devotion 
to which he must surrender and sacrifice himself in order to earn and 
to obtain his unique position. A common inheritance and a common 
cause unite artists consciously or unconsciously: it must be admitted 
that the union is mostly unconscious. Between the true artists of any 
time there is, I believe, an unconscious community. (SE 23-41 
For "a common inheritance and a common cause" the poet should make it his 
ultimate task to transform his personal experiences into something universal 
and impersonal, if he is to be a true poet. Thus if "individual talent" of the poet 
is to be meaningful at all, he must be aware of "tradition", and "tradition" is 
only rightly approachable through the process of depersonalization in the 
creation of the work of art. What is important for the poet is not an expression 
of personal emotion, but "an expression of significant emotion, emotion which 
has its life in the poem and not in the history of the poet" (SW 59). Of course 
"only those who have personality and emotions know what it means to want to 
escape from these t h g s "  (SW 58). For the poetic experience has to be "formed 
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out of many personal experiences ordered in some way which may be very 
different from the way of valuation of practical life, in the expression of it" 
(UPUC 30). 
The depersonalization, "an escape from personality" (SW 58), is the 
transmutation of the poet's personal emotion into something "which has its life 
in the poem". In this process of transmutation, the labor of the poet is not just 
creative but rather essentially critical: "the large part of the labour of an  
author in composing his work is critical labour; the labour of sifting, 
combining, construction, expunging, correcting, testing: this frightful toil is as 
much critical as creative" (SE 30). Thus Eliot emphasizes "the critical mind 
operating in poetry, that is, the critical effort which goes to the writing of it," 
apart from "the critical mind upon poetry" (UPUC 30). Eliot compares this 
critical mind of the poet to the catalyst in chemical reaction: "the more perfect 
the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers 
and the mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest and 
transmute the passions which are its material" (SW 54). "The poet's mind is in 
fact a receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, 
images", which must be united to form a new compound (SW 55). The poet's 
maturity consists not in having a personality to express, but in "being a more 
finely perfected medium in which special, or very varied, feelings are at liberty 
to enter into new combinations" (SW 53-4). Therefore, what matters is not the 
greatness of the emotions and feelings but "the intensity of the artistic process, 
the pressure, so to speak, under which the fusion takes place" (SW 55). 
The new emotion or self, embodied in the poem under "the fusion" of 
depersonalization, transcends the poet's ordinary emotion or self. As A.D. 
Moody pertinently summed up, 
The personality of the poet, or the sensibility realised in the poetry, is 
not the same thing as his ordinary personality. What every poet start 
from is his own emotions; but his life as a poet consists in transmuting 
'his personal and private agonies into something rich and strange, 
something universal and impersonal'('Shakespeare and the Stoicism 
of Seneca' S.E., p. 137.) This new creation is essentially a new self, the 
man recreated in the making of the poem.5) 
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Finally the poem itself is impersonal. It is "not just either what the poet 
'planned' or what the reader conceives, nor is its 'use' restricted wholly to what 
the author intended or to what it actually does for readers" (UPUC 31). What 
Eliot ultimately aims at  by the "Impersonal theory of poetry" (SW 531, is in 
this impersonal nature of the poem in which tradition and the individual 
talent conform each other, and the living and the dead coexist: 
The emotion of art  is impersonal. And the poet cannot reach this 
impersonality without surrendering himself wholly to the work to be 
done. And he is not likely to know what is to be done unless he lives in 
what is not merely the present moment of the past, unless he is 
conscious, not of what is dead, but of what is already living. (SW 59) 
111. "Soul-Making" Towards a Felt Whole 
The poet recreated in the poem through the process of depersonalization is 
essentially a new self that not only transcends the original personality and 
emotions but also forms an unconscious or conscious union between the true 
artists of any time (SE 23-4). Eliot's concept of the creation of a new self - 
"soul-making" - in the poem is inseparable from his philosophical thought of 
knowledge and experience. He is  against the dualistic view of reality, 
according to which the world is made up of the opposites from the beginning. 
To the contrary, the world is not differentiated a t  the initial stage of our 
experience, i.e. immediate experience. With self-consciousness, we experience 
reality as incompatibly differentiated. 
immediate experience ... is a timeless unity which is not as such 
present either anywhere or to anyone. It is only in the world of objects 
that  we have time and space and selves. By the failure of any 
experience to be merely immediate, by its lack of harmony and 
cohesion, we find ourselves as conscious souls in a world of 
5 )  T.S. Eliot: Poet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 73. 
6) T.S. Eliot, Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy 0fF.H. Bradley (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Company, 1964) p. 31. This is a dissertation submitted in 1916 for 
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Eliot views the world of objects as dialectically dynanic: "the world not as 
ready made - the world, that is, of meaning for us - but as constructed, or 
constructing itself ... at every moment, and never more than an approximate 
construction, a construction essentially practical in its nature" (KE 136). So 
experience proves "essentially indefinable". Within experience there are 
present the two opposite aspects such as ideality and reality, objectivity and 
subjectivity, mind and body. But the distinction of the opposites is not 
independent: "ths distinction did not correspond to a division among objects: 
for a thing is real or ideal only in relation" (A73 157). As Eliot says, "we can 
think only in terms of things" (KE 165). And "from the first the thing is 
thoroughly relative", existing "only in a context of experience, of experience 
with which it is continuous" (I(E 165). So our knowledge of reality is relative, 
neither subjective nor objective. As "an 'objective' truth is a relative truth" (KE 
169), and  "each individual's experience is  unique and  not fully 
communicable",7j there is no possibility of total communication between selves. 
Therefore "the true critic is a scrupulous avoider of formulae; he refrains from 
statements which pretend to be literally true; he finds fact nowhere and 
approximation always. His truths are truths of experience rather than of 
calculation" (I(E 164, My italics).8j 
Although truth is definable only in the relation of things, and our reality 
itself is ever constructing and constructed, Eliot believes that every object has 
"the moment of objectivity" (KE 1651, and that we have "a felt whole" in 
common (A73 155). According to Eliot, "From first to last reality is experience, 
but experience would not (so far as we know) be possible without attention and 
the degree of Dodor of Philosophy at Harvard University, but not published until 
1964. In that this dissertation was written before the f i s t  part of 'Tradition and the 
Individual Talent" (published in 1919 in The Egoist) and i t  provides a strong 
philosophical foundation for his literary principles, for the student of literature "it can 
be genuinely illuminating. Perhaps it is best read as a covert arspoetica." Moody, bid. 
p.73. 
7) Morrissey, bid. p. 4. 
8) But this does not mean that the poet or the critic may ignore fad. Conversely, the 
critic must have "a very highly developed sense of fact" (SE 31). Eliot said, "the sense 
of fact is something very slow to develop, and its complete development means 
perhaps the very pinnacle of civilisation"(SE 31). 
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the moment of objectivity" (AT3 165). Our real situation in this world is that 
"we have ... a felt whole in which there are moments of knowledge: the objects 
are constantly shifting, and new transpositions of objectivity and feeling 
constantly developing" (KF 155). If we perceive an object, we perceive it "in a 
special relation to our body. In our practical relations with objects we find it 
convenient and even essential to consider the object's relation to ourself as 
itself an object. ... This self may be primarily the body, but the body is in felt 
continuity with the spiritual self' (AT3 155). Therefore with Eliot epistemology 
is inseparable from metaphysics and this inseparability is suggested to have 
given us the fine arts: 
where the presence of the self is an important part in the meaning of 
the knowledge, a sort of theory of knowledge is at work. It is this sort 
of knowing, I presume, that induces us to think of knowing as a 
relation. There is a relation between the object and the self: a relation 
which is theoretical and not merely adual, in the sense that the self as 
a term capable of relation with other terms is a construction. And this 
self which is objectified and related is continuous and felt to be 
continuous with the self which is subject and not an element in that 
which is known. As it is metaphysics which has produced the self so it 
is epistemology, we may say, which has produced knowledge. It is 
perhaps epistemology (though I offer this only as a suggestion, and to 
make clearer the sort of thing that I mean) that has given us the fine 
arts; for what was at  first expression and behaviour may have 
developed under the complications of self-consciousness, as we became 
aware of ourselves as reading aesthetically to the object. (IOi 155) 
The second stage of our experience in this world is that of dwsociation; for 
the conscious self, reality, our experience of the world of the objects, is viewed 
as dissociated. But there is a felt continuity between the object and the self; 
the object has its meaning only in relation to the self; "wherever there is the 
Zch, there is a continuity between the Zch and its object; not only in the case of 
perception, but in every case of knowledge" (KE 74). In other words, a field of 
reality is "a condition and expression of the self' (KF 74). This notion of a 
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continuity between the object and the self explains Eliot's important literary 
theories, such as the process of depersonalization, unified sensibility, objective 
correlative. 
Eliot discusses the third stage in our experience of the world, which, 
founded on his faith in the felt continuity in the relation of the self and the 
object, mrects toward the recovery of the unified sensibility of the immediate 
experience beyond the stage of dissociation. Eliot's concept of poetry as  
"organic wholes" and "tradition" fundamentally rests on this faith. Hence the 
call for the poet, to recover the original unity of sensibility from its present 
dissociation which has resulted from the dualistic thinking since the 
seventeenth century: 
The poets of the seventeenth century, the successors of the dramatists 
of the sixteenth, possessed a mechanism of sensibility which could 
devour any kind of experience. ... In the seventeenth century a 
dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we have never recovered; 
and this dissociation, as is natural, was aggravated by the influence of 
the two most powerfd poets of the century, Milton and Dryden. (SE 
287-8) 
The creation of the new self in the poem originates from this supreme call 
for the poet to recover the unified sensibility, i.e. to create "the felt wholen 
where the relations of objects are constantly shifting, and new transfigurations 
of them are constantly developing. 
W. The Autotelic Nature of the Work of Art & Points of View 
As we have discovered the true poem is impersonal. The work of art is 
autotelic, having its own existence as an  object. Apparently, in order to make 
this impersonal object, the poet should have a disinterested point of view. 
Paradoxically, however, the poet is not free from his own bias. This paradox 
leads us to another fact: the reader is not free from his own bias, either: 'both 
artist and audience are limited (UPUC 109). So we recognize, with Eliot, 
"'Pure' artistic appreciation is ... only an ideal ... so long as the appreciation of 
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art is an affair of limited and transient human beings existing in space and 
time" (UPUC 109). Even in the matter of readmg his own poem, a poet does 
not have more advantage than the reader, for "indeed, in the course of time a 
poet may become merely a reader in respect to his own works, forgetting his 
original meaning - or without forgetting, merely changing" (UPUC 130). So 
"what a poem means is as much what it means to others as what it means to 
the author7' (UPUC 130): "The reader's interpretation may differ from the 
author's and be equally valid, or even better" (OPP 30). Naturally, "The poem's 
existence is somewhere between the writer and the reader; it has a reality 
which is not simply the reality of what the writer is trying to 'express', or of his 
experience of writing it, or of the experience of the reader or the writer as 
reader" (UPUC 30). Therefore, "honest criticism and sensitive appreciation are 
directed not upon the poet but upon the poetry" (SW 53). 
It may sound incompatible if the poet with his own limitations can create an 
impersonal work of art which does not belong to any point of view. Yet, clearly 
Eliot believes that it is one thing to create a work of art which does not belong 
to any point of view and it is another to admit that the poet is not free from a 
limited point of view. Then the question is: how does the poet create this 
object, admitting his limited point of view? 
In "Tradition and the Individual Talent", Eliot suggests that the poet can 
accomplish this task only with a "process of depersonalization" (SE 7). In the 
relation to "tradition" the new substance in the process is achieved "by way of 
the transubstantiation of the old" (Bolgan 90): 
In other words, what Eliot was suggesting in "Tradition and the 
Individual Talent" was not only that the creati've process is to be 
understood in  terms of the process whereby the personal is  
depersonalized but he was suggesting as well that such a concept of 
creativity is an expression of, and depends for its operational validity 
on, a quite different theory of the soul than the one he was "struggling 
to attack" in that particular essay. (Bolgan 90-1) 
Eliot says, "In order to know what a particular event is, you must know the 
soul to which it occurs, and the soul exists only in the events which occur to it; 
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so that the soul is, in fact, the whole world of its experience at any moment, 
while both soul and event transcend that moment. The soul is its whole past 
so far as that past enters into the present, and it is the past as implied in the 
present" (KE 79, My italics). In this sense the soul is, as F.H. Bradley said, "the 
present datum of psychical fact, plus its actual past and its conditional 
futuren.g) 
Eliot's soul is "something one progressively makes and makes ... by means 
of a ceaseless process of transubstantiation" of the old and the new (Bolgan 
91). In other words, Eliot's "soul-making" rests on "the continuity of the 
phenomenal or personal self with the noumenal or impersonal self and in the 
conviction that the first of these gains actual substance and significance in 
time only to the extent that it enters into the becoming of the other in time" 
(Bolgan 92). "Soul-malung" is possible only because, "in any case, we are 
constantly developing and rectifying our perceptions by comparison with other 
perceptions; we are  constantly on the lookout for error" (KE 155). The 
conscious self, in the world of dissociation, where "neither point of view is more 
nearly ultimate than the other" (KE 30), indulges itself in "the painful task of 
unifying (to a greater or less extent) jarring and incompatible ones, and 
passing, when possible, from two or more discordant viewpoints to a higher 
which shall somehow include and transmute them" (KE 147-8). The ideal end 
of this painful task is a new form of immediate experience, "a time less unity": 
"an all-inclusive experience outside of which nothing shall fall" (KE 31). 
What is it to have a "point of view"? What is its relation to the painful task 
of unification? We face here the essentially paradoxical nature of the process of 
soul-making. Not belonging to any point of view is quite different from having 
no point of view. In other words, it does not proceed from the impersonal 
nature of the work of art that it does not have any point of view. Conversely, it 
i s  by having a particular point of view tha t  we can move towards i ts  
transcendence. In the work of art there is a continuous movement towards 
higher points of view, which transcend the two points of view, built on the 
dialectical unification of the two, losing neither. As soon as the unification, the 
9) quoted from Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley, p. 79. 
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third point of view, is achieved, however, it gives way to a higher point of &w, 
containing all the previous ones therein. So i t  is now clear that by the 
impersonal nature of the work of art, i.e. that it does not belong to any point of 
view, Eliot means that there is ever fbll of the newly forming points of view 
towards a dialectical unification of the previous: 
We are unable to say, however, that one point of view is right and the 
other wrong, for we thus imply an element of identity, or of identical 
reference; the assertion of one point of view against another must be 
made from a third point of view, which somehow contains the first and 
the second. And yet it must be noticed (for I see no way to avoid this 
hair-splitting) that it is only from the third point of view that the first 
two are therein contained. For as soon as we have realized that we 
have reached a third point of view we are already at a fourth, in which 
the first and second reassert themselves once more. So that it is only 
so long as we can support a particular point of view ... that we can 
believe that the contradiction between truth and error is superseded. 
(m 121) 
How does the poet make the transmutation of the discordant points of view 
actually happen in the work of art? To answer this question, we must ask first 
"In what way do we reach a third point of view in the work of imagination?" 
This inevitably leads us to a relation of the poem and the reader. In the 
philosophical thesis, Eliot questions, "Can we, in reading a novel, simply 
assume the characters and the situation?" (KE 123). We know that "the 
characters and the situations are all 'imaginary"' (KE 123). In order to be 
imaginary, however, "they must be contrasted with something which is real" 
and "to be contrasted it must be more than a pure reference" (KE 124). In 
other words it must have "a reality of its own distinct from its reference. The 
fiction is thus more than a fiction; it is a real fiction" (KE 124): 
An imaginary object has thus two main aspects: its intention to be real 
and its reality as an intention. As the former it is limited by its paucity 
of relations; as the latter it exists by virtue of its relations. There is, 
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strictly speaking, no imaginary objective: we attend to a complex 
which comprehends two points of view - a real object with few 
relations and an intended object which consists of its relations. (ICE 
125) 
The work of art  is only possible from another third point of view, which 
contains the previous two. The process of our making the third point of view in 
reading a work of imagination is closely related to the autotelic nature of the 
work of art, i.e. the independence of the fictional character by its "internal 
necessity": 
We thus analyse the intended object of fiction into its reference and its 
reality. The reality in its turn is not a simple object but an intended 
object, for it includes everything from the antecedents of the character 
in the author's mind, to the symbols which express the character on 
paper. We may mean the character as a presentatcon to the author's 
mind,; but a figure in fiction may and often does have an existence for 
us distinct from what is merely our interpretation of what the author 
'had in mind'. Frequently we feel more confidence in our own 
interpretation of the character than in any account of the genesis and 
meaning which the author may give himself. This is not always mere 
accident; no really 'vita1' character in fiction is altogether a conscious 
construction of the author. On the contrary, it may be a sort of 
parasitic growth upon the author's personality, developing by internal 
necessity as much as by external addition. So that we come to feel that 
the point of view from which the author criticizes is not wholly 
internal to the point of view from which he created the character. Of 
course this difference should not be insisted upon, for the author may 
shift from a creative to a critical point of view and back a t  any 
moment. Now a character which is 'lived through', which is real to us 
not merely by suggesting 'that sort of person' but by its independent 
cogency, is to the extent of its success real. Treating it as imaginary 
involves a change of viewpoint. Besides this reality, the character has 
other relations which are inconsistent with reality. It belongs in other 
contexts, has relations which are incompatible with its reality. Its 
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unreality, therefore, is not in itself, but in relations extending far 
beyond itself; its reality is its reference, and its unreality as that to 
which it refers is its reality as an 'imaginary' object. And, on the other 
hand, as an imaginary object it is just as real as anything; it is as a 
real object that it is imaginary. ... When we speak of the character as a 
fiction we mean a relation between an object real from one point of 
view and certain entities (ultimately physical) which are real from 
another point of view. The imaginary object, it will follow, is a highly 
complex ideal construction. It exists as such only from a third point of 
view ... (K!3 124-5. My italics.) 
This 'internal necessity,' which explains the independence of the work of art, is 
also crucial to understanding the active role of the reader. For Eliot the reader 
is no longer a passive recipient who receives the represented result of a given 
process of creation. The other side of the process of depersonalization is "to 
establish the reader's status as a co-creator of the work of art" (Bolgan 62). 
Whenever the reader enters into the impersonal world of art, he is invited to 
experience personally, without the poet's intrusion, so at  the very moment of 
construction he finds hlmself a t  the centre of the p a i h l  task of unification. As 
Bolgan warned, however, this does not endow the reader with liberty to do 
whatever he wants: 
If the reader ... is confronted by Eliot with a "do-it-yourself' poem, it 
does not follow from this that he can "do it" in any way he likes, for the 
process is both self-generative and self-corrective as it goes along. 
What the new methodology emphasizes is that the use of "objective 
correlative[sl" will provide, as nothing else can, a precisely controlled 
subjective response and one that is unique in being both subjective 
and impersonal a t  the very same time. It is so in the sense that, 
although it is personally generated and felt, what is generated and felt 
is both guided and restrained by the systematic and therefore 
impersonal relations whose objective lineaments the reader has 
retraced. (Bolgan 87) 
It is no wonder then that Eliot has required of the reader the shift of attention 
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from the author's personality or intention to the objective structure of the text 
itself. 
I t  is clear that the process of soul-making itself is not possible without 
creating ever-superseding points of view. And this process of depersonalization 
has two aspects: the poet must depersonalize his ordinary emotions by way of 
the working of this dialectical unification of the points of view, and then the 
results of the depersonalization, the poetic emotions, must evoke the same 
dialectical unification of the points of view from the reader. As we discovered, 
the work of art is to be an object where "the real world would consist in the 
relations of points whose entire existence was relation" (I(E 160) and where 
through the forming and re-forming of the relations the ever constructing 
unification is possible. How does the poet create such an object with ever- 
forming relations of points of view? The transmutation of the discordant points 
of view in the work of art is not automatically given as soon as any work is 
completed. It requires "great labour" (SW 491, for only those who have the 
historical sense, the "sense of the timeless as well as the temporal together" 
(SW 491, can create such a timeless unity in the work. Just by cataloguing 
several points of view the poet cannot create "soul-making" in his work. The 
points of view should be coherently related to each other. In other words, the 
dialectical transpositions of objects and relations should be presented through 
the relations of the points of view. The soul-making, the transfiguration of the 
moments of objectivity or the transubstantiation of the selves towards a felt 
whole is, by nature, inseparable from the dialectical unification of the various 
points of view. So the point of view is to imply "soul"; it should be something 
through which the ordinary emotion turns significant; it should be the frame 
by which the apparently unrelated experiences are organized and coherently 
related to each other. 
As we have discovered, Eliot's Impersonal theory of poetry starts from his 
concept of poetry as "a living whole of all the poetry that has ever been 
written" (SW 53). Its firm philosophical basis is this: our knowledge is only 
meaningfbl in the presence of the self; the self and the object is continuous and 
related; and "the objectified and related self' is continuous with "the subject 
self." In the view of literature as "organic wholes," there is something more 
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valuable which brings us to a common allegiance than something just 
individual. In the best poems, "the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their 
immortality most vigorously" (SW 48). So if he is to be a true poet, the poet 
must have the historical sense which is developed with "great labour" and only 
with this sense he can make his work to be among "a common inheritance and 
a common cause" which unite him to the past as well as to the present. To 
make his work united to this common inheritance and common cause, the poet 
should escape from his own personality to express something more valuable. 
The process of depersonalization in the work of art is the transmutation of the 
personal experiences into something universal and impersonal. 
Philosophically speaking, its aim is to create the objectified and related self, 
which is continuous with the subject self and the object as well. In order to 
create this sort of self, the poet escape from the direct expression of his 
personality. In a later essay Eliot emphasises this again: 
No artist produces great art by a deliberate attempt to express his 
personality. He expresses his personality indirectly through 
concentrating upon a task which is a task in the same sense as the 
making of an efficient engine or the turning of a jug or a table-leg. (SE 
114) 
If we recall the metaphor of catalyst, the comparison becomes more pertinent. 
The finished poem is compared to something independent of the poet and the 
poet to an engineer or a carpenter. The poet's mind is what should "constantly 
amalgamate" various experiences: 
When a poet's mind is perfectly equipped for its work, it is constantly 
amalgamating disparate experience; the ordinary man's experience is 
chaotic, irregular, fragmentary. The latter falls in love, or reads 
Spinoza, and these two experiences have nothing to do with each 
other, or with the noise of the typewriter or the smell of cooking; in the 
mind of the poet these experiences are always forming new wholes. 
(SE 287) 
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The true poet is never simply to "arouse these same emotions in the 
audience" (CC 38), a t  however primitive a stage of expression and 
appreciation. If he forces his own impressions upon the reader, the outcome 
may not be called a work of imagination. It is just a report of his subjective 
impressions, not the work of art. The point of view works at this point. It is 
closely bound up with the amalgamation or abstraction of the ordinary 
emotions by whch the "disparate7' experiences forms new wholes, for through 
the points of view, the "chaotic, irregular, fragmentary" experiences are 
organised into something coherently related. 
Therefore, "it is essential that a work of art should be self-consistent, that 
an artist should consciously or unconsciously draw a circle beyond which he 
does not trespass: on the one hand actual life is always the material, and on 
the other hand an abstraction from actual life is necessary condition to the 
creation of the work of art" (SE 111). In other words, the depersonalization is 
"an abstraction from actual life." But as Eliot also admits, an artist is a human 
with his own bias. He cannot be a totally disinterested personality. But Eliot 
believes that the poet, if he develops the historical consciousness and is aware 
of his task as a poet to depersonalize his ordinary emotions into something 
impersonal and universal, can reach an unconscious union between the true 
poets of all ages. 
V. Eliot's Use of the Personal Pronouns for Various Voices 
The voices are closely related to the points of view in their presentation. The 
third point of view, only through which the work of imagination becomes 
possible, lurks in or behind the Eliot's speaker. We can recall the philosophical 
foundation for why the creation of interaction between various points of view 
- selves or 'finite centres' as Eliot suggests - is inseparable from "the soul" of 
the work of art that aims at the unity of sensibility where we feel "the whole 
world of its experience at any moment", through the ceaseless process of 
trasubstantiation of the old and the new, passing from one point of view to 
anather (KE 79). 
The complex of the process comes from the fact that "we are constantly 
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passing ... from the judgment as reality to the judgment as a qualification of 
ourself' (KE 78). That is, "in memory and in the observation of the actions of 
others we have reference to events which are never as such actual" (KE 78). 
This means that we do not have "a consistent enough point of view to 
determine a subject matter" (KE 78). I t  is always from a complicated 
interaction of points of view that the idea or judgment is an event, not from the 
point of view of the subject, nor from the outsider's. The reason is that the 
theory of identity in our observation of the actions of others, has two aspects: 
first, the relations of the events are "determined only by the real world from 
the point of view of the subject, and externally by the real world ... from 
somebody else's point of view" and second, "the soul is not something definite 
to which phenomena can be attached all on the same plane, but varies with 
the meaning which each phenomenon has for it" (Kt2 79). As a result, 
We are unable to say, however, that one point of view is right and the 
other wrong, for we thus imply an element of identity, or of identical 
reference; the assertion of one point of view against another must be 
made from a third point of view, which somehow contains the first and 
the second. And yet it must be noticed (for I see no way to avoid this 
hair-splitting) that it is only from the third point of view that the &-st 
two are therein contained. For as soon as we have realized that we 
have reached a third point of view we are already at a fourth, in which 
the first and second reassert themselves once more. So that it is only 
so long as we can support a particular point of view ... that we can 
believe that the contradiction between truth and error is superseded. 
(KE 121) 
Eliot discusses, "when we speak of the character as  a fiction, we mean a 
relation between an object real from one point of view and certain entities 
(ultimately physical) which are real from another point of view" (KE 125) and 
"Treating it as imaginary involves a change of viewpoint" (KE 124). Here we 
"qualify our world by the recognition of another's" and ' b e  vary by passing 
from one point of view to another" or '%y occupying more than one point of 
view at  the same time ... we vary by self-transcendence" (KE 147. My italics). 
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In short, both the recognition of and the transcendence of one point of view at 
the same time forms the base of soul-making: "The self, we find, seems to 
depend upon a world whch in turn depends upon it. ... And the self depends as 
well upon other selves; it is not given as  a direct experience, but is an  
interpretation of experience by interaction with other selves" (KE 146). Soul- 
malung is the process of self-transcendence, "the painful task of unifylng (to a 
greater or less extent) jarring and incompatible ones, and passing, when 
possible, from two or more discordant viewpoints to a higher which shall 
somehow include and transmute them" (KE 147-8). So we agree with Eliot 
when he say, 
So that I do not believe that the author in process of composition is 
ever, in practice, occupied with a single point of view; or that in 
practice any moment ever exists when one point of view is in exclusive 
possession. But the 'imaginary object' has all these relations and in 
fact is these relations. (KE 125) 
There is no moment one point of view is exclusive in the work of art; there 
are the relations of points of view. The relations are coherently bound up with 
the theme of the poem, i.e. the tonalities of the voice of the poet. In Eliot's 
poetry, these relations are  usually controlled by the use of pronouns, 
particularly the first and the second person pronoun, "I" and "you." They 
become complex and sometimes enigmatic, as different kinds of consciousness 
and their relations are included in the pronouns. The "you" in "The Love Song 
of J. Alfred Prufrock," for example, may be the presumed silent listener, the 
other self of Prufrock, the reader, or all these. Especially in Eliot's early poems 
the reader feels certain disparity between the real and the superficial, i.e. 
some hidden conflict or invisible tension between the characters, or between 
two selves in one person. Eliot uses the pronouns to control this degree of 
disparity; to create manifold points of view, then to unify or compare them, or 
to hide or define a dominant consciousness in his poem, all of which contribute 
to the process of depersonalization of the poet's personal self. 
In general, the early poems focus on the split consciousness of an individual 
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self. "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" is getting more and more 
introspective as the hdden conflict of his two split selves is exemplified in the 
.pronouns "I" and "you". Besides, in  the pronoun "you", the readers' 
consciousness lurks and finally separates itself in the false "we", betraying the 
presumed sympathy of "I". The male narrator as the dominant consciousness 
of "Portrait of a Lady" assumes himself as a social being, unlike Prufrock. We 
catch this assumption in the use of an indefinite pronoun "we". Here also "you" 
stands between the speaker's other self and the readers, but more objective. In 
"Preludes" there is a male observer's consciousness that observes a woman 
"you". But as soon as this observer is called "he", there appears another 
observer "I", observing "he" the man who observes "you". 
Even in the early poems in the use of the impersonal "you" there is a move 
from the individual's consciousness to common consciousness. In "Rhapsody on 
a Windy Night", the consciousness of the poem focuses on the two selves in 
one's internal consciousness. But it is extended to a common consciousness at 
the end, where the impersonal "you" is getting more dominant. In The Waste 
Land, the poet boldly juxtaposes many kinds of consciousness, and tries to 
unite all into one. As fragments "shored against" our ruins, the identities of 
and the relationships between the various kinds of consciousness change from 
episode to episode, according to the use of the pronouns, "I", "you", "one", and 
"we". But as the poem unfolds, the definite pronouns grow more and more 
inclusive "we" and "one". 
In later poems, especially in Four Quartets, there is a complete picture of 
this move from an individual self "I", through some tentative suspension of its 
particularity and the growing use of more inclusive "we", towards a complete 
community with the readers. The use of the pronouns varies from passage to 
passage. Their identities, their different kinds of consciousness are defined in 
and between the context. It is not fured. In most cases dominant consciousness 
falls between the relations of the pronouns, especially between "you" and "I," 
creating subtle difference of point of view. The various fragments of reality are 
invoked by this difference between the consciousnesses. 
The use of pronouns is coherently related to the working of memory, not for 
restriction - of the speaker or the reader to himself - but "For liberation?not 
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less of love but expandingof love" (Little Gidding, 111). Even when the speaker 
directs to a definite individual, through a memory, there is always another 
consciousness of his double and the readers, as is shown in "Preludes" and "La 
Figlia Che Piange". It is not simple, our mode of being. One and one's double 
are never fured and never effaced in unified consciousness, because the other 
face of being is always in the course of forming: 
So I assumed a double part, and cried 
And heard another's voice cry: What! Are you here? 
Although we were not. I was still the same, 
Knowing myself yet being someone other - 
And he a face still forming; yet the words sufficed 
To compel the recognition they preceded. (Little Gidding, 11) 
'Yet the words suficedPTo compel the recognition they preceded, as an effort 
to unify both, or to go beyond both for groping toward the missing recognition. 
With t h s  recognition of oneself, the words, one's medium of restoring the lost 
meaning, may open the possibility of one's general communion with the 
others. So "I" who "was still the same" is not what 'I' had been, just as "calling 
the beginning is often the e n d  is making a new beginning, not going back to 
an old one. The past experience restored to a new meaning is not the same as 
before. It is a base for a new start, a new communication. As the individualised 
"I" comes to get more and more of this recognition, through the journey of its 
memory accompanied by "you", the poem moves to a more and more inclusive 
"we". The destination of this journey may be to get to "the still point", where 
"there we have been", where "we" started: "a condition of complete simplicity"; 
where the only hope lies in "the choice of pyre or pyre" or "the fire and the rose 
are one" (Burnt Norton, Little Gidding). 
In every poem there is a memory of past experiences restored to a new 
meaning by the speaker's present recollections: "do not call it fixitytwhere past 
and future are  gathered" (Burnt Norton, 11). Therefore not only the 
consciousness, individual and common, but also the consciousness, past and 
present, gather together in Eliot's poem. It  is not just "gathering." It  is a 
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systematic organisation - construction - of the experiences which is only 
possible through the interaction of points of view. Furthennore the process of 
this organisation is what enables each of Eliot poems to be a "sudden 
illumination", not just of one life but of many generations: "the past experience 
revived in the meaning/Is not the experience of one life only/But of many 
generations" (The Dry Salvages, 11). The "sudden illumination" is really new in 
the sense that it is what the poet, speaker, or the reader has not seen before in 
the past experience. It becomes possible only through the perspective of a 
whole. And the process of "soul-making" completes itself in this "sudden 
illumination," the result of the "painhl task of unification": the communion, 
"the common consciousness of all who can feel themselves at one in this 'Order 
of words"', for "a further union, a deeper communion" (East Coker, V). 
VI. Conclusion: Soul-Making in "Portrait of a Lady" 
Even early poetry of T.S. Eliot is not easy to understand, not to mention 
analyzing it according to the theme of "soul-making" established above. It is 
partly because Eliot's poetry also share the several reasons for the 'difficulty' of 
modern poetry in the question of meaning, which Eliot himself indicated in 
"The Modern Mind" (UPUC 151): causes, novelty, and the author's 
omission of something which the reader is used to finding.10) But it is mainly 
because Eliot prefers the impersonal methods. 
As Eliot says about the poetry of Dante, "It is a test (a positive test, I do not 
assert that it is always valid negatively) that genuine poetry can communicate 
before it is understood" (SE 200), though he continues: "The impression can be 
verified on fuller knowledge". As poetry may begin with just an image or a 
rhythm which precedes any conscious meaning, so "what we should consider is 
not so much the meaning of the images, but the reverse process, that which 
led a man having an idea to express it in images" (SE 204).11) 
10) T.S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (London, 1964; first published 
1933). . 
11) T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950; first 
published 1932). 
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So I must reassure of myself that the meaning of the poem, the ideas and 
the beliefs of the poet, is not there to be seen. It is in most cases hidden behind 
the rich suggestiveness of the poetic devices in the middle of which the act of 
"soul-making" is placed. What Eliot said about Temyson applies to himself, 
"Tennyson's surface, his technical accomplishment, is intimate with his 
depths: what we most quickly see about him is that which moves between the 
surface and the depths" (SE 295). So the impersonal devices in Eliot's poetry 
are closely connected with and gradually lead the reader to the process of 
"soul-making". In a word, instead of telling us, Eliot attempts the Dantean 
method, "to make us see what he saw" (SE 205). But at the same time what I 
should not forget is that Eliot's poetry, like Dante's, is "a whole, that you must 
in the end comes to understand every part in order understand any part7' (SE 
219). So while I "suspend both belief and disbelief', I would like to focus on the 
poetry itself with the immediate poetic suggestiveness and to acquaint myself 
well with Eliot's poem part by part. 
The act of "soul-making" is achieved mostly by the tones and registers 
under the authoritative control of the poetic devices. Here I must admit that it 
is not easy to catch every tone and register in the poetry of Eliot on which the 
process of "soul-making" mostly depends. But I may begin by concentrating on 
the impersonal devices of T.S. Eliot, the use of personae often as masks for the 
poet himself, the use of pronouns as inhcator of the various points of view, 
successive shift of images, echoes of the past poets, the dramatic scenes, the 
musical patterns by "the auditory imagination", and the succession, the 
repetition or recurrences of certain phrases, imagery, and situations, which 
establish their interactive relations and significances. Then from these 
impersonal techniques by which the characters and their worlds are 
objectively created - "dissociated, I may proceed on the authoritative control 
of the tones and the registers, the act of "soul-making", which unifies the 
various points of view and transcends the dssociated states. Finally I hope, 
through the precise investigation of these initial approaches, the meaning, i.e. 
the ultimate achievement of the act of "soul-making" in the poem reveals itself. 
Let me take "Portrait of a Lady" for an  example, to see how Eliot's 
impersonal techniques create the two main characters and their worlds 
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objectively, placing the reader, with the poet, as the observer of the drama. 
Eliot does not require the reader to sympathize with the subjective state of the 
characters, but presents it as an object for detached observation. The poem 
presents each part lke  a scene of drama, but more complicated, for unlike the 
direct presentation of characters of drama, the poem is presented just through 
the speaker's point of view. So there does not actually exist the lady's point of 
view but her portrait through the speaker. But what is most important is that 
though it is only possible through the speaker to reach the lady's subjectivity, 
the dramatic presentation forbids him to control the points of view, bringing 
the tones and nuances of the lady's speech. The poet's impersonal method is 
apparently contrasted with that of the lady who is anxious for sympathy in 
vain. So the detached stance of the speaker at the beginning seems to be 
superior, which he himself is convinced of. But the point of the poem lies in the 
revelation of the false position of the speaker to the reader and to the speaker 
as well. That is, the lady's embarrassing appeal for sympathy in vain results 
from both her naive romanticism that does not penetrate the reality of the 
speaker or rather life, and the speaker's false conviction of his superiority. 
'Tortrait of a Lady" from the first part shows the poet's effort to unify the 
scenes and the subjective consciousness. The male speaker begins with an 
impersonal description of temporal setting, which proves to be subtly coloured 
by h s  subjectivity. In the next line the scene to the speaker seems to arrange 
itself, conforming to her intention. The impersonal presentation of the 
arranged scene in the fourth and fifth lines precedes the speaker's 
generalisation of it, associated by his subjective impression: 'An atmosphere of 
Juliet's tomb/Prepared for all the things to be said or left unsaid'. While this 
projection of the speaker's subjectivity into the scene is gradually done line by 
line, the reader comes aware of more subjective feelings of the speaker in the 
later lines than in the first line, with his ironically detached tone already set 
in. 
The next six lines show conflicting attitudes between the speaker and the 
lady in their different reactions to "the latest Pole". Whereas it becomes 
burlesque by his comment, she brings heavy and profound themes - "soul" 
and true friendship - whch seem to be out of place or too romantic before his 
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over-realistic attitude. After this direct conveyance of her speech, the speaker 
secures his distance by making a generalisation of her speech. He is not 
affected at all. But the music, "attenuated tones of violins/mingled with remote 
cornets", which is harmonious with her sensibility, suggests her tones and 
nuances among her "velleities and carefully caught regrets" in her second 
speech. It is about friendship but against the speaker's detached mood her 
desperate appeals for sympathy sounds like monologue. 
The speaker brings music metaphors for his inner conflict in the next seven 
lines, but more important is that the speaker observes his own consciousness, 
being very self-conscious. "Inside my brain a dull tom-tom beginslAbsurdly 
hammering a prelude of its ownJCapricious monotoneD'hat is at least one 
definite 'false note."' This is the speaker's impersonal generalisation of his 
subjectivity, making this poem to be also the portrait of the speaker's own in 
his try to portray the lady. 
But in the fmal five lines of the first part, the speaker does not confront the 
inner conflict but escapes into the world of man as a social being. At this point 
of his evasion from self-consciousness (his awareness of his consciousness), the 
reader comes to be clearly aware of a third point of view: the lady's conveyed 
by the speaker, the speaker': and an authoritatively detached one (possibly 
the poet's). His escape seems not to be convincing against her persistent 
appeal, with his consciousness under the strong pressure from what she says. 
Though this kind of distraction comes from h s  self-possession, the foundation 
of which, i.e. h s  claim to the superiority of his point of view proves false. He is 
just for the worldly things and the commonplace. 
In part 11, the speaker's impersonal description of the lilacs in the first three 
lines is closely connected with his psychology. "One" which is twisted "in her 
fingers" is the metaphor of himself. Here is created unmistakable irony 
between her act and what she says, but more crucial is the speaker's 
identification of himself with the lilac. So her act "(Slowly twisting the lilac 
stalks)" stresses her oppressive power over the speaker, with the effect of 
cinematic close-up in visual parentheses. Slowly but firmly pressing his mind, 
the lady achieves her superiority in the following speech. While the speaker's 
self-possession would not confront h s  reality to the end, making her voice "the 
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insistent out-of-tunelof a broken violin" inside his brain, she candidly 
confesses her reality. Though her opinion of him proves to be wrong, she is 
quite well aware of her reality at least, "what she is": "But what have I, but 
what have I, my friendno give you, what can you receive from me?/Only the 
friendship and the sympathylof one about to reach her journey's end." In this 
context, his excuse sounds even self-mocking, far from being justification: "how 
can 1 make a cowardly amends/For what she has said to me?" 
His escape into the world of the commonplace is clearly unconvincing or his 
"naked portrayal of himself in that world does not match hers, while his self- 
possession is so easily defeated just by "a street-piano" or "the smell of 
hyacinths". In spite of the speaker's assertion to himself, "I keep my 
countenance4 remain self-possessed", the final line reveals that he is shaken 
by her enough to wonder "Are these ideas right or wrong?" 
Part I11 deals with the collapse of the speaker's false self-possession, as the 
speaker's inner conflict grows. "The October night comes down" exactly 
resembles "The winter evening settles down" in the first line of "Preludes", as 
the presentation of temporal setting by subjective mind. The next three lines 
effectively figure the speaker's difficulty in restoring the shaken self- 
possession: "returning as before/Except for a sltght sensation of being ill at 
ease4 mounted the stairs and turn the handle of the doorIAnd feel as if I had 
mounted on my hands and knees". While the speaker feels it is harder to 
confront her, his superiority, mainly coming from his predictability of what she 
says or what she does, seems to be empowered when it is verified: "My self- 
possession flares up for a second;/This is as  I had reckoned". But its 
momentary nature is clearly suggested in "a second, supplemented by "flares 
up", which associates his self-possession to the "four wax candles" in the initial 
scene. So her persistent inquiry of the reasons for the failure of their 
friendship, unpredicted by him, collapses h s  self-possession ruthlessly enough 
not to be recovered as before. There remains nothing of his self-possession, like 
the candle which "gutters" out, "we are really in the darY.12) His self- 
12) In thls poem the use of the pronouns as the indicator of various point of view is not 
prominent. If I focus on the pronoun "we" here, it seems to indicate not "the lady" and 
the speaker, but indefinite "we" from the speaker's point of view, regarding him as a 
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possession, as his faithful guard for his appearance to the lady, totally lost, the 
speaker "suddenly" feels himself like a stranger "in a glass". 
It may be that such kind of self-recognition of his inner division as this 
should have led him to confront his reality and make a sincere communication 
with her. Instead, he chooses to "borrow" another masks: "And I must borrow 
every changing shape/To find expression ... dance, dancellike a dancing 
bearJCry like a parrot, chatter like an ape". Though this desperate state is 
more than pathetic, being even clownish for its embarrassing mimicry, it 
patches his self-possession successfully enough to escape temporarily into the 
world of "a tobacco trance", preparing for the next 'Well!" 
But the speaker's shaken self-possession and his awareness of his 
inferiority, with the reader, seems to be definite, though the speaker does not 
admit it clearly: 'Would she not have the advantage, after all?" So he is doubt 
of himself, his feelings and even hls "right to smile", though still some part of 
him tries to keep his countenance by forcing a coincidence between his 
contemplation and the music to which his "inside" music has been "the 
insistent out-of-tune": "This music is successful with a 'dying fall'/Now that we 
talk of dying -" But the en&ng line dominates the whole mood: "And should I 
have the right to smile?" 
At the end of "Portrait of a lady" the reader is leR with the subjectivity of 
the speaker, quite different from that at the beginning. The poet has begun 
with the impersonal description of the setting but it becomes soon closely 
connected with the subjective state of the characters.13) The most effective 
presentation of these connections can be traced in Eliot's calculated use of the 
images and metaphors, especially music, lilacs and wax candles, which are 
also the clear indicator of conflicting points of view and the shiRs of their inner 
states. Important ironic effects come from the dramatic structure of the scenes, 
creating the authoritative point of view early in the poem, which the reader 
social being. So this "we" may match with "youn in the final stanza of part 11. In thls 
sense the dominant consciousness of 'Fortrait of a Lady" assumes itself basically as a 
social being, unlike Prufrock. 
13) It may be sigmfxant that finally the speaker's affected subjectivity is able to urufy the 
two settings: "Afternoon, grey and smoky, evening yellow and rose" 
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comes to share. The objective presentation of characters and their worlds 
given through the impersonal techniques, finally the meaning of the act of 
"soul-malung" in this poem comes. Both of the lady's and the speaker's point of 
view turn out to be wrong. But what is of great importance in this poem is that 
the speaker comes to be aware, of his false superiority and his responsibility 
for the failed human relationship with the lady, and moreover that the reader, 
with the poet, stands on the transcendent point of view. 
It may not matter whether the act of "soul-malung" on the part of the 
speaker is complete or not, who still remains wondering at  the end. Eliot as a 
poet and a human, may be interested in the emptiness of human relationship, 
related with the matter of expression. As he points out, when we lose our own 
expression, we are really in the dark. But there is the poet's recognition that 
false expression like the mimicry of a dancing bear, a parrot, and an ape, could 
be worse. Maybe the speaker, "sitting pen in hand at the end, is the portrait 
of the poet himself, "doubtful" of the right use of the pen, but knowing its 
immense power. 
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